A *fun* ambiguity

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The primary goal of this paper is to identify an ambiguity in adjectives like *fun* and *tasty*, describe the distribution of the two readings, and propose a semantic theory that derives both readings and explains the distribution. The observation is that these adjectives have an overlooked non-dispositional reading meaning something like "caused fun" or "caused gustatory pleasure". The interesting distributional fact is that this ambiguity closely parallels the habitual/episodic ambiguity of eventive verbs: in habitual-friendly environments *fun* adjectives get the dispositional reading, and in episodic-friendly ones, the non-dispositional reading. The proposed theory follows the standard approach to habituals: I assume that the primitive lexical meaning of *fun* adjectives is non-dispositional, and derive the dispositional meaning with a covert generic quantifier Γ. This proposal accounts for a broad range of data that isn't captured by existing accounts of *fun* adjectives.

In the final two sections of the paper, I pursue a secondary goal: to make a preliminary case that the ambiguity itself and the theory proposed bear importantly on certain foundational issues about so-called "predicates of personal taste." Firstly, the proposed approach to fun adjectives satisfies a prima facie desirable condition that most Contextualist theories do not: it draws a clear line in the semantic representation between evaluative and non-evaluative (or descriptive) *fun* sentences. I suggest that when *fun* adjectives get an evaluative interpretation, the evaluative character is due to the modality of the generic Γ. This helps explain why some *fun* sentences (the evaluative ones) give rise to apparently "Faultless Disagreements", though others (the non-evaluative ones) cannot.

Secondly, I argue that there is no coherent semantic paradigm deserving the term "predicates of personal taste". Predicates which intuitively express subjective or perspective-dependent properties are semantically fragmented; there is no general semantic upshot of taste. And semantically coherent categories - even individual expressions - can be metaphysically fragmented into some intuitively subjective occurrences and other intuitively non-subjective uses, yet there is no apparent distributional/compositional difference between e.g. the subjective *better opera* and the objective *better golf score*.

1 A *fun* ambiguity

There are two rather different things you could mean by (1).[1]

(1) *The Texas Giant was fun.*

One thing you could mean is that someone had fun riding the Texas Giant. We can see this reading pretty unambiguously in (2).

(2) *Ben went to Six Flags yesterday. The Texas Giant was fun.*

The other thing you could mean is that the Texas Giant has a certain standing property of characteristically causing fun or being disposed to cause fun, as in (3).

(3) *I can't believe they replaced the wooden track with a steel one. The Texas Giant was fun, but it probably isn't anymore.*

A number of adjectives exhibit this ***fun* ambiguity**. It was noted by Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009), whose terminology I'll follow in calling the (2)-reading **non-dispositional** (the **n-reading**) and the (3)-reading **dispositional** (the **d-reading**).

2 What are the two meanings?

To get a better sense of the flavor of the dispositional/non-dispositional alternation, let's consider a few more examples.

Non-dispositional[2]

(4) *Last night, I had some of those cheese puffs when I was drunk. They were delicious.*

(5) *I watched* Andrei Rublev *this morning. That sure was boring.*

(6) *I tried to solve problem #17 last night. It was difficult.*

Dispositional

[1] The Texas Giant is a roller coaster in the Six Flags amusement park in Arlington, Texas.

[2] With certain contextual stage-setting, you could probably coax a dispositional interpretation from (4) - (6); but without further contextual specification, the non-dispositional interpretation is much more prominent in these examples. Thanks to Jeff King for pointing this out with some convincing examples.

(7) *Those cheese puffs are delicious.*

(8) Andrei Rublev *is boring.*

(9) *Problem #17 is difficult.*

Let's call adjectives like *delicious*, *boring*, and *difficult* that exhibit the *fun* ambiguity ***fun* adjectives** and sentences containing them ***fun* sentences**.

I'm going to argue here that *fun* adjectives are semantically non-dispositional and that the d-reading is derived via the presence of a covert generic operator Γ.

2.1 Dispositional reading

The d-reading of *fun* adjectives has been much-discussed in the Literature on Predicates of Personal Taste.[3] There are two common interpretations of dispositional *fun* sentences in the Literature, which I'll call **the judge interpretation** and **the standard interpretation**.[4]

(10) *The Texas Giant is fun.*

On the judge interpretation, (10) means that a certain individual or group (the **judge**) is disposed to enjoy riding the Texas Giant. (Alternatively: the Texas Giant is disposed to cause the judge enjoyment).

On the standard interpretation, (10) means that the Texas Giant is judged enjoyable relative to a certain **standard** of taste. What does it mean for an individual or group to hold a certain standard of taste? It's not obvious. Is there a difference between being disposed to cause Ben enjoyment vs. being deemed enjoyable relative to Ben's standard of taste?

I think there is an important and overlooked distinction that can be made between one sense of "holding a standard" and being disposed to enjoy. Consider cases like (11) and (12).

(11) *This haunted house is so frightening. But since I work here, I know all the surprises, and so it isn't isn't frightening for me.*

[3] I think the term "predicates of personal taste" originates with Lasersohn (2005). Some important contributions include Lasersohn (2005); Stephenson (2007); Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009); Egan (2010).

[4] I'm being deliberately vague about what I mean by two "interpretations". The language of judges and standards often gets used in informal glosses of *fun* sentences. But it also divides semantic theories. Some theories have an extra argument place for a judge (i.e. a sentient agent) (Stephenson (2007), Egan (2010), Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009)); others for an abstract standard of taste (e.g. a scale) (Lasersohn (2005), Schaffer (2011), Sundell (2011)).

(12) Andrei Rublev *is not a boring film. But since I've seen it like a million times, it's pretty boring for me.*

In (11) the speaker is expressly indisposed to be frightened, yet still somehow committed to the verdict that the haunted house is frightening. So no disposition, but perhaps we could say she holds a standard of taste that affirms being frightened. The speaker expresses something like her *approval* of responding to the haunted house with fright. Call this approbative sort of interpretation *evaluative*; in (11) and (12) we can see the evaluative meaning come apart from the dispositional meaning. So we should keep in mind that what I call the "d-reading" at least sometimes conveys a meaning that doesn't seem to report the disposition of a particular individual or group; rather, it expresses that an individual (typically the speaker) approves of or deems correct a particular kind of response.[5]

I'm going ot suggest that evaluativity is a feature characteristic of those *fun* sentences that can give rise to apparent "Faultless Disagreements." But not all *fun* sentences are of this evaluative character. Non-dispositional sentences like (2) appear to be non-evaluative: they report an affective response, but do not commit the speaker to any judgment about the correctness of that affective response. And *fun* adjectives which have their point of view specified by a Prepositional Phrase[6] are also apparently non-evaluative; e.g. in contrast to (10), (15) reports what the speaker is disposed to enjoy, not what he deems enjoyable.

(15) *The Texas Giant is fun for me.*

Suppose the speaker does not personally enjoy the Texas Giant, but considers it (objectively) fun; in such a case, (10) may be appropriate, but (15) is not.

[5] I think the difference between *find* and *consider* is germane here: the dispositional meaning is like *find*-embeddings and the evaluative reading is like *consider*-embeddings. In (11) the speaker doesn't find the haunted house frightening, but does consider it frightening. A number of people have suggested a close connection between asserting *fun* and finding fun:

> *When I say* This cake is tasty*, I commit myself to finding the cake tasty.*
> Pearson (2012), p. 121.

> *When we're using aesthetic vocabulary* committedly*, our willingness to assert, and to assent to assertions of, "the dead fish smells better than the lilacs"* does *hinge on (our views about) our own reactions, or dispositions to react to, the objects in question.*
> Egan (2010), p. 252.

But examples like (11) and (12) suggest it's not finding but considering fun that is required for asserting bare *fun* sentences. Here's a pair of sentences that helps bolster the point:

(13) *Jake's raving about Ron Paul is annoying, although I don't find it annoying anymore because I've learned to tune it out.*

(14) ?? *Jake's raving about Ron Paul is annoying, although I don't consider it annoying anymore because...*

[6] I'll call these **Perspectival Prepositional Phrases (PPPs)**

2.2 n-reading

On the other hand, the n-reading has been almost entirely overlooked in the Literature on Predicates of Personal Taste. A secondary goal of this paper is simply to do publicity work for the n-reading: it exists, it is distinct from the d-reading, and the correct semantic theory should derive it.

The one explicit discussion is the aforementioned Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009), who point it out but propose to ignore it. They assume that PPTs are semantically dispositional, suggesting that the n-reading may be a conversational implicature. This hypothesis has little to commend it. The n-reading does not seem to be cancellable. For example, I cannot think of any continuation of (2) that would cancel the implication that Ben had fun. Nor does the d-reading seem to be semantically invariant - there doesn't seem to be any dispositional meaning to (2) or (4) - (6). Perhaps more importantly, as we will see in §3, the distribution of the two readings obeys certain grammatical constraints, e.g. having to do with tense and aspect, and in contrast depends little on cooperativity or speaker intentions. This is the stuff of compositional semantics, not Gricean pragmatics, and we should accordingly reject the implicature story.

While Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) is to my knowledge the only place where the d/n-alternation comes up, a closely related alternation does get mentioned in several places[7] - the particular vs. generalized interpretation of non-finite clauses in *fun* sentences.[8]

(16) *Dancing the polka was fun.*

In (16) *fun* can predicate either a particular occasion of dancing the polka or a such occasions generally. These authors, however, have not observed that that the same alternation may arise even in sentences (like (2) and (3)) which have no overt event-denoting material like a non-finite clause.

Lasersohn (2005)'s comments are particularly suggestive. He notes the contrast between (17) and (18).[9]

Context: Let's go bowling!

(17) *Come on. It'll be fun!*

(18) *Bowling is fun!*

He observes that in (17) the speaker predicts that the participants in a particular event - the proposed bowling event - will have fun. In contrast, (18) expresses the speaker's point of view, similar to a case like (10). Lasersohn generalizes,

[7] Lasersohn (2005), Bhatt and Izvorski (1997), Chierchia (1984)
[8] Sentence (16) is from Chierchia (1984).
[9] Lasersohn (2005) p. 673

claiming that *fun* ascriptions with nominal subjects behave "much more like [(18)] than [(17)]."[10] That is, according to Lasersohn, *fun* ascriptions to events may be dispositional or non-dispositional, but *fun* ascriptions to individuals are dispositional. But as we've seen there are *fun* ascriptions to individuals that report particular affective responses, e.g. (2) and (4) - (6). So, *pace* Lasersohn (2005), some *fun* ascriptions to individuals are actually rather more like (17) than (17).

The n-reading is apparently straightforward to characterize: (4) reports an occasion in which the speaker experienced gustatory pleasure; (5) reports an occasion in which the speaker experienced boredom; and (6) reports an occasion in which the speaker experienced difficulty. (As we saw in (2), however, it doesn't always have to be the *speaker's* affective response.) In short, it looks like the n-readings report one-off affective responses: the experiencer had such-and-such an experience.

So we have a contrast between (n-reading) a report of a one-off affective response vs. (d-reading) an evaluative judgment or disposition ascription.

To my knowledge, all existing theories of *fun* adjectives - including both Relativist theories (Lasersohn (2005); Stephenson (2007); Egan (2010)) and Contextualist theories (Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009); Glanzberg (Glanzberg); Schaffer (2011)) - fail to derive the n-reading in the semantics. On these theories, the primitive lexical meaning of *fun* is dispositional.[11] The only extant non-semantic proposal that I know of is the conversational implicature story of Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009).

So a primary advantage of the approach I pursue in §3 is simply that it can derive both readings. I take the primitive lexical meaning to be non-dispositional, and derive the dispositional reading via covert generic quantification. This has the additional advantage of explaining the distribution of the two readings - why we get the dispositional reading in generic-friendly environments and the non-dispositional reading in episodic-friendly environments.

3 Parallel ambiguities and the semantics of *fun* adjectives

3.1 Methodological preliminaries

So there's this "ambiguity." I introduce the scare quotes here to highlight the fact that ambiguity is a theoretically loaded (though not exactly univocal) term. What are we going to say about this "ambiguity"?

[10] Lasersohn (2005) p. 673

[11] This is not always completely explicit in the semantics. But it can be (not uncharitably) reconstructed from e.g. the fact that these authors give almost invariably dispositional examples and either the dispositional or standard glosses (neither of which is anything like the non-dispositional meaning).

I'm going to say that it *is* an ambiguity in the same sense that (e.g.) a quantifier scope ambiguity is an ambiguity: a single sentence is associated with distinct semantic representations (LFs, trees, derivational histories, expressions in a semantic representation language, ...). In other words: let's handle this in the compositional semantics. There will be a single, univocal lexical entry for *fun* adjectives, but its composition with other denotations results in two kinds of readings for *fun* sentences.

Now at this point I certainly haven't said much for or against trying to handle it in the compositional semantics. Alternatives abound - lexical ambiguity, polysemy, conversational implicature, conventional implicature, god knows what else.

My strategy will be to point out a number of distributional similarities between the *fun* ambiguity and another alternation - the habitual / episodic alternation of eventive verbs - and suggest that we treat the *fun* ambiguity using the same tools standardly applied to that alternation - namely, covert generic quantification.

It's orthodox to treat this other alternation in the compositional semantics.[12] Why?

The long answer depends on a lot of specifics (some of which follow shortly). But the short answer: because that alternation interacts in robust, systematic ways with (*inter alia*) quantification, tense, aspect, and nominal reference. This is the stuff of compositional semantics.

The d/n-alternation also interacts in robust, systematic ways with the stuff of compositional semantics. In fact, for the most part *the same stuff* and *in the same ways* as the habitual/episodic-alternation.

3.2 Distribution and semantics

There are three different (but closely related) things I want to do in this section. First, I want to compare the distribution of the d/n-alternation of *fun* adjectives to the distribution of the h/e alternation of eventive verbs. (This has not, to my knowledge, ever been considered elsewhere.) Second, I want to motivate and present the classical (Lewis-Carlson) theory of adverbial quantifiers and generics; this part is not at all novel. Third, I want to present a toy semantic implementation of the classical theory, and show how the representations therein are adequate to capturing the meaning of (both evaluative and non-evaluative) dispositional *fun* sentences. Nothing rides on the particular implementation; the important idea, rather, is that any adequate semantics of generics will also be suitable to capturing important facts about meaning of *fun* sentences.

Let's take a look at these two alternations and the semantic representations we can use to explain them. *Eventive Verb Phrases* (for the most part *dynamic*

[12] Cf. especially the papers in Carlson and Pelletier (1995).

things like *to swim* or *to crush* and not *static* things like *to be smart* or *to know French*) have these two different kinds of interpretations. And like the d/n-alternation, in a Simple Past tense clause we can get both readings.

(19) *Mary swam gracefully.*

(20) *A few of us went to the lake yesterday. Mary swam gracefully.*

(21) *It's a shame Mary had to have knee surgery. She swam gracefully.*

(22) *The OrangeTasticTorquenator crushed oranges.*

(23) *This morning I made a smoothie. The OrangeTasticTorquenator crushed oranges, and I put the juice in the blender with some bananas and kale.*

(24) *It's a shame the OrangeTasticTorquenator broke. It crushed oranges, but now it doesn't do a damn thing.*

(19) and (22) are ambiguous between the habitual and episodic interpretations. The episodics (20) and (23) report occasions of swimming and crushing. The habituals (21) and (24) are more abstract: (21) describes the (past) characteristic manner of Mary's swimming and (24) the (past) telos or capability of the OrangeTasticTorquenator.

A jumping off point for the theory of habituals is the observation that they have an interpretation very similar to their adverbially quantified counterparts.

(25) *It's a shame Mary had to have knee surgery. She always swam gracefully.*

(21) and (25) seem to mean something quite similar. The way the adverbially quantified sentence gets to that meaning is by quantifying over something (let's say swimmings):

(26) Always [Mary swims] [Mary swims gracefully].

The idea is then to treat habituals like we treat Q-adverbs in the semantics.[13] Habituals introduce some semantic element similar in meaning to Q-adverbs, which we'll represent with Γ.

(27) Γ [Mary swims] [Mary swims gracefully].

The empirical similarities between the interpretation of adverbially quantified clauses and habitual clauses are numerous. Both can be restricted by *when*-clauses.

[13]This idea originates, I believe, with Lawler (1972). The approach I follow here, linking genericity to the tripartite structures of Lewis (1997), was first proposed by Carlson (1989).

(28) *I always make a fool of myself when I'm drunk.*

(29) Always [I'm drunk] [I make a fool of myself].

(30) *I make a fool of myself when I'm drunk.*

(31) Γ [I'm drunk] [I make a fool of myself].

Both can quantify over individuals introduced by bare plurals or indefinites.

(32) *Philosophers* (*always*) *make fools of themselves when they're drunk.*

(33) *A philosopher* (*always*) *makes a fool of himself when he's drunk.*

(34) Γ / Always [philosopher x is drunk] [x makes a fool of himself].

Both can quantify over the sorts of "cases" involved in donkey-anaphora:

(35) *A man who owns a donkey* (*always*) *loves it.*

(36) Γ / Always [man x owns donkey y] [x loves y].

The Classical (Lewisian) Theory[14] of adverbial quantification goes roughly like this.

> *What we can say, safely and with full generality, is that our adverbs of quantification are quantifiers over cases. What holds always, sometimes, never, usually, often, or seldom is what holds in, respectively, all, some, no, most, many, or few cases... What is a case?... It will help if we attend to our adverbs of quantification as they can appear in a special dialect: the dialect of mathematicians, linguists, philosophers, and lawyers, in which variables are used routinely to overcome the limitations of more colloquial means of pronominalization. Taking m, n, p as variables over natural numbers, and x y z as variables over persons, consider:*
>
> *(14) Always, p divides the product of m and n only if some factor of p divides m and the quotient of p by that factor divides n.*
>
> *(15) Sometimes, p divides the product of m and n although p divides neither m nor n.*
>
> *(16) Sometimes it happens that x sells stolen goods to y, who sells them to z, who sells them back to x.*
>
> *(17) Usually, x reminds me of y if and only if y reminds me of x.*
>
> *Here it seems that if we are quantifying over cases, then we must have a case corresponding to each admissible assignment of values*

[14] Lewis (1997)

to the variables that occur free in the modified sentence. Thus (14) is true iff every assignment of natural numbers as values of m, n, and p makes the open sentence after always true - in other words, iff all triples of natural numbers satisfy that open sentence.[15]

Here's a simple version of that semantics.[16]

(37) $[\![Always'[RESTRICTOR\{x_1...x_n\}][MATRIX]]\!]^g = 1$ iff
For all sequences $(a_1 \ ... \ a_n)$:
if $[\![RESTRICTOR]\!]^{g[a_1/x_1...a_n/x_n]} = 1$
then $[\![MATRIX]\!]^{g[a_1/x_1...a_n/x_n]} = 1$

That is: $Always'[RESTRICTOR][MATRIX]$ is true just in case all assignments to variables free in the restrictor that make the restrictor true must also be assignments that make the matrix true. Here are the truth conditions (ignoring tense) of (25) and (35):

(38) $[\![Always'[swims'(mary, e)]\,[swims.gracefully'(mary, e)]]\!]^g = 1$ iff
For all sequences (a_1):
if $[\![swim'(mary, e)]\!]^{g[a_1/e]} = 1$
then $[\![swim.gracefully'(mary, e)]\!]^{g[a_1/e]} = 1$
"For all cases in which Mary is swimming, Mary is swimming gracefully."

(39) $[\![Always'[man'(x) \wedge donkey'(y) \wedge owns'(x, y)]\,[loves'(x, y)]]\!]^g = 1$ iff
For all sequences (a, b):
if $[\![man'(x) \wedge donkey'(y) \wedge owns'(x, y)]\!]^{g[a/x,b/y]} = 1$
then $[\![loves'(x, y)]\!]^{g[a/x,b/y]} = 1$
"For all cases in which there's a man and a donkey and he owns it, he loves it."

The habitual works exactly the same, with the caveat that Γ expresses some different relation between variable assignments than *Always* does. We'll come back to that shortly.

Non-quantified episodic sentences can be treated straightforwardly without any fancy quantificational operators.[17]

[15] Lewis (1997) p. 8-9

[16] Notational footnote: $\{x_1...x_n\}$ are variables free in the first clause (the **restrictor**) and $g[a_1/x_1...a_n/x_n]$ is an assignment differing at most from g on $x_1...x_n$ that assigns x_1 to a_1 ... and x_n to a_n

[17] I have "overloaded" the denotation brackets: when, as in (40), they take a natural language expression as input, they output the corresponding expression in the semantic representation language; when, as in (38) - (39), they take an expression in the semantic representation language as input, they output its model-theoretic truth-condition

(40) $[\![(20)]\!] = swim.gracefully'(mary, e)$

An individual a_1 and event e_1 satisfy $swim.gracefully'$ just in case e_1 is an occasion of a_1 is swimming gracefully. Here, there is a free variable for an event in the semantic representation; this corresponds to the introduction of a new event discourse referent. The variable can also take a value anaphorically.[18]

(41) *Mary* [*went swimming yesterday*]^{e_1}. *She* [*swam gracefully*]$_{e_1}$.

(42) $[\![(41)]\!] = swim.gracefully'(mary, e_1)$

Non-dispositional *fun* sentences work exactly the same way. Crucially, the lexical entry for fun adjectives should be non-dispositional: a_1, b_1, e_1 satisfy fun' just in case a_1 is causing b_1 enjoyment in e_1.[19]

(45) $[\![fun]\!] = \lambda x \lambda e \lambda y[fun'(y, x, e)]$

A non-dispositional interpretation may be driven by a plausible antecedent event, and it may introduce a new event or simply be anaphoric.

(46) $[\![(2)]\!] = fun'(texas.giant, ben, e_2)$

(47) *Ben* [*rode the Texas Giant*]^{e_1}. *The Texas Giant* [*was fun*]$_{e_1}$.

(48) $[\![(47)]\!] = fun'(texas.giant, ben, e_1)$

How does a sentence encode whether the verb interpretation is habitual or episodic? This varies cross-linguistically, but in English there are some Tense and Aspectual constraints. Simple Present sentences with eventive verb phrases are obligatorily habitual.

[18] Notational footnote: superscripts indicate the introduction of discourse referents and subscripts indicate anaphora.

[19] This lexical meaning will satisfy an important condition that Taranto (2006) proposes in her excellent but very brief discussion of *fun* adjectives ("Event Adjectives" is her term):

Participation Requirement: The individual denoted by the experiencer of *fun* is a participant in the event denoted by the event argument of the adjective.

This is why, for example, (47) gets interpreted as reporting *Ben's* experience: the event described is one in which Ben is a participant.

There can be cases, however, in which the "most salient" event participant is not the judge.

(43) *Ben and I went to Six Flags. He rode the Texas Giant. It was fun. Not for him, of course, because he hates roller coasters - but it was quite enjoyable to watch him squirm and scream.*

Is this a counterexample to the Participation requirement? Not at all. The event of which *fun* is predicated may be interpreted as the speaker's watching rather than Ben's riding. However, we can't get a speaker-oriented interpretation of fun in (44), since it is established in the discourse that the speaker did not participate in *any* event suitable to be an argument of *fun*.

(44) *Ben went to Six Flags. I wasn't there. He rode the Texas Giant. It was fun.* [*#For me, that is... I enjoy that roller coaster.*]

(49) *Mary swims gracefully.*

(50) $\Gamma\ [swim'(mary, e)]\,[swim.gracefully'(mary, e)]$

Similarly, *fun* adjectives in the Simple Present are dispositional.

(51) $[\![$*The Texas Giant is fun*$]\!] = \Gamma$
$[ride'(x, texas.giant, e)]\,[fun'(texas.giant, x, e)]$

As we've seen, both eventive verbs and fun adjectives are ambiguous in the Simple Past. Relatedly, they co-vary with two distinct interpretations of *when*-clauses. Sometimes *when*-clauses introduce temporal / eventuality discourse referents.

(52) [*When* I_a *was drunk*]^{e_1}, I_a [*made a fool of myself*]$_{e_1}$.

(53) $drunk'(a, e_1) \wedge past'(e_1) \wedge make.a.fool.of'(a, a, e_1)$

Here, a *when*-clause acts the same as a cross-sentential antecedent.

(54) I_a [*was drunk*]^{e_1}. I_a [*made a fool of myself*]$_{e_1}$.

(55) $drunk'(a, e_1) \wedge past'(e_1) \wedge make.a.fool.of'(a, a, e_1)$

But *when*-clauses can also restrict the domain of quantifiers, including Q-adverbs or the habitual quantifier Γ.

(56) [*When* I_a *am drunk*]^e, I_a ***always*** [*make a fool of myself*]$_e$.

(57) $Always'[drunk'(a, e)][make.a.fool.of'(a, a, e)]$

(58) [*When* I_a *am drunk*]^e, I_a [*make a fool of myself*]$_e$.

(59) $\Gamma\ [drunk'(a, e)][make.a.fool.of'(a, a, e)]$

The fact that *when*-clauses appear to act as restrictors in habitual sentences like (58) gives us some evidential support for our Q-adverbial treatment of habituals: *when*-clauses can only act as restrictors when there's an appropriate quantificational operator around to restrict.

when-clauses can also restrict dispositional *fun* adjectives with or without quantificational adverbs.

(60) [*When* I_a *am drunk*]^e, [*those cheese puffs*]$_b$ *are*$_e$ ***always*** *delicious.*

(61) $Always'[drunk'(a, e)][delicious'(b, a, e)]$

(62) [*When* I_a *am drunk*]^e, [*those cheese puffs*]$_b$ *are*$_e$ *delicious.*

(63) $\Gamma\ [drunk'(a,e)][delicious'(b,a,e)]$

The fact that a *when*-clause can occur in (62) as a restrictor suggests that, contrary to surface appearances, (62) must have some quantificational element that can be restricted.

Like eventive verb phrases, fun adjectives can also occur with referential *when*-clauses that behave similarly to cross-sentential antecedents.

(64) $[When\ I_a\ was\ drunk]^{e_1}$, $[those\ cheese\ puffs]_b\ were_{e_1}\ delicious.$

(65) $I_a\ [was\ drunk]^{e_1}.\ [Those\ cheese\ puffs]_b\ [were\ delicious]_{e_1}.$

(66) $drunk'(a,e_1) \wedge past'(e)_1 \wedge delicious'(b,a,e_1)$

Here we get the non-dispositional interpretation: on the reported occasion, the speaker had a pleasurable gustatory response to those cheese puffs. Just as habituals typically co-occur with restrictor *when*-clauses and episodics with referential *when*-clauses, so too do dispositional fun adjectives typically co-occur with restrictor *when*-clauses and non-dispositional with referential *when*-clauses.

There is also a dedicated Past habitual marking in English: verb phrases under *used to* are obligatorily habitual (I ignore tense in the semantic representation, for simplicity).

(67) *Mary used to swim gracefully.*

(68) $\Gamma\ [swim'(mary,e)]\ [swim.gracefully'(mary,e)]$

As we'd expect, fun adjectives are obligatorily dispositional under *used to* (again ignoring tense in the representation).

(69) *The Texas Giant used to be fun.*

(70) $\Gamma\ [ride'(x,texas.giant,e)]\ [fun'(texas.giant,x,e)]$

Finally, both habituals and dispositional fun adjectives involve quantification over *nonactual* cases. There are habituals which are apparently true but have no actual satisfying cases.[20] For example, (71) and (72) may be true even if the OrangeTasticTorquenator has never crushed an orange and my car has never gone 150mph.

(71) *The OrangeTasticTorquenator crushes oranges.*

(72) *My car goes 150mph.*

[20] Carlson (1977)

(71) tells us the telos of the OrangeTasticTorquenator. (72) tells us a capability of my car. Even habituals that do have actual satisfying cases don't necessarily mean *usually* or *in most cases*.

(73) Fuschia *is spelled f-u-s-c-h-i-a.*[21]

(73) tells us how *fuschia* is *supposed* to be spelled. One way to capture these interpretations is to treat the generic operator Γ as implicitly *modal*.

One (representationally) simple way to do this is a possible worlds semantics with implicit restrictors and variable quantificational strength. All of this comes together in (74). (Again, nothing really rides on this particular choice of implementation; any semantics for generics that captures the intuitively modal character of cases like (71)-(73) should also capture the intuitively modal character of (some) fun sentences.

(74) $[\![\Gamma[RESTRICTOR\{x_1 ... x_n\}][MATRIX]]\!]^{w,B,g} = 1$ iff
For {all / some / ...} worlds and sequences w', (a_1 ... a_n):
if $w' \in B_w$ and $[\![RESTRICTOR \wedge \varphi\ ]\!]^{w',B,g[a_1/x_1 ... a_n/x_n]} = 1$
then $[\![MATRIX]\!]^{w',B,g[a_1/x_1 ... a_n/x_n]} = 1$
where φ is a (pragmatically supplied) implicit restrictor
and B is an accessibility function

The possible worlds component involves evaluating the restrictor and matrix relative to worlds in a set B_w accessible from the world w of evaluation. Implicit restrictors are conditions appearing in the restrictor clause that are not contributed by any linguistic material - e.g. $perform.telos'(a, e)$ in (75). Variable quantificational strength means that Γ may express different relations between world and sequence pairs: sometimes it means *all*, sometimes *some*, and perhaps other times, other quantificational relations.

For example, here are candidate denotations for (71), (72), and (73):

(75) $[\![\Gamma[perform.telos'(a, e)][\exists x[crush'(a, x, e) \wedge orange'(x)]]\ ]\!]^{w,B,g} = 1$ iff
For all worlds and sequences w', (d):
If $[\![perform.telos'(a, e)]\!]^{w',B,g[d/e]} = 1$
then $[\![\exists x[crush'(a, x, e) \wedge orange'(x)]]\!]^{w',B,g[d/e]} = 1$
B_w is a set of worlds compatible with the function of the OrangeTasticTorquenator at w

[21] For this example and very helpful discussion on these issues I am indebted to Matthew Stone.

(76) $[\![\Gamma[go'(b,e)][go.150mph'(b,e)]\ ]\!]^{w,B,g} = 1$ iff
There exists a world and sequence w', (a_1):
$w' \in B_w$ and $[\![go'(b,e)]\!]^{w',B,g[a_1/e]} = 1$
and $[\![go.150mph'(b,e)]\!]^{w',B,g[a_1/e]} = 1$
B_w is a set of worlds compatible with the capabilities of my car at w

(77) $[\![\Gamma[spell.fuschia'(x,e)][spell.fuschia.fuschia'(x,e)]\ ]\!]^{w,B,g} = 1$ iff
For all worlds and sequences w', (a_1,a_2):
if $w' \in B_w$ and $[\![spell.fuschia'(x,e)]\!]^{w',B,g[a_1/x,a_2/e]} = 1$
then $[\![spell.fuschia.fuschia'(x,e)]\!]^{w',B,g[a_1/x,a_2/e]} = 1$
B_w is a set of worlds compatible with the rules of English spelling at w

We can use exactly the same mechanism to explain the evaluative character of dispositional *fun* sentences.[22] Recall that evaluative *fun* sentences express roughly the judgment that a certain response to an event of experiencing some entity is correct or appropriate. This modal meaning is very similar to the habitual meaning in (73). (73) is not about how I spell *fuschia*, or most people spell *fuschia*, but about how to *corre*ctly spell *fuschia* given the rules of English. Similarly, we can interpret (10) as saying how to *correctly* respond on an occasion of riding the Texas Giant.[23]

(78) $[\![\textit{The Texas Giant}_a \textit{ is fun}]\!] =$
$\Gamma[ride'(x,a,e) \wedge respond.correctly'(x,a,e)]\,[fun'(a,x,e)]$

[22]Snyder (2013) also proposes that the evaluative interpretation of PPTs is due to the modality of habituals.

[23]I want to point out binding of the event argument is one of the essential features of this account, and the one that most significantly distinguishes it from previous Γ theories of PPTs. There have been a number of PPT-proposals involving a generic quantifier like Γ (typically notated *"GEN"*). Lasersohn (2005) considers and rejects using a generic quantifier over judges (p. 653). Moltmann (2010) introduces and Pearson (2012) builds upon the hypothesis that "first-person-based genericity [is] the source of faultless disagreement in general, for any expressions with which it may arise" (p. 189). Snyder (2013) also proposes a Γ-theory, and introduces an important idea that I'll endorse: the evaluativity of *fun* adjectives comes from the modal interpretation of Γ. These accounts typically are motivated by and try to capture the idea that evaluative *fun* sentences involve generic quantification over judges.

The motivation from distributional parallels with the habitual/episodic alternation, however, is primarily about quantification over *events*, not individuals. None of the other accounts appeal to the *fun* ambiguity, or its distribution, and none are well-positioned to derive the non-dispositional interpretation of *fun* adjectives.

Lasersohn (2005), Moltmann (2010) and Snyder (2013) consider only generic quantification over *individuals*. Pearson (2012) and Snyder (2013) propose that the genericity of *fun* adjectives is due to the fact that they are Individual-Level Predicates, and following the proposal of Chierchia (1995) treat Individual-Level Predicates as "implicit generics." If this is right, however, fun adjectives are *invariably* generic, so there's no line to be drawn between the dispositional and non-dispositional readings.

In short, these authors use genericity almost exclusively as a way to characterize a meaning of *fun* along the lines of "fun for people in general", which, I hope it is now clear, is not what is important about the genericity of (some) *fun* sentences.

This is evaluated relative to a set of worlds B_w compatible with the norms of correctness for fun at w and (let's say) a universal interpretation of Γ: true iff all events of riding the Texas Giant in which the rider responds correctly to the experience are events in which the Texas Giant causes the rider enjoyment. Abbreviating: it is correct to respond to riding the Texas Giant with enjoyment. This seems like an acceptably accurate representation of the evaluative meaning of (10), and, especially in light of similarities to habituals like (77), seems like a plausible interpretation of Γ.

The evaluative character is notably lacking from non-dispositional fun sentences because it enters the scene by way of the modality of Γ, and non-dispositional fun sentences don't have denotations with Γ.

(79) $[\![(2)]\!] = fun'(tg, ben, e_1)$

Here this simply means that the Texas Giant caused Ben enjoyment; no judgment is made about whether that response was the suitable or appropriate one.

3.3 Deverbal Experiencer Adjectives

One final point in favor of a generic treatment of the *fun* ambiguity. Most paradigmatic *fun* adjectives are deverbal and have verbal counterparts that behave in similar ways.[24] A particularly apt case is *tasty* and *taste good*. The thing about *taste good* is that it's an Eventive Verb Phrase and thus will be habitual/episodic-ambiguous.

(80) *That beer tasted good to me.*

(81) *That beer tastes good to me.*

The lowest-hanging fruit approach to the *tasty* alternation is to treat it semantically more-or-less the same as the *taste good* alternation. And in support of this, not only is *taste good* e/h-ambiguous, it's also ambiguous between non-evaluative (81) and evaluative (82) habitual interpretations.

(82) *That beer tastes good.*

So we have not only general distributional parallels between *fun* adjectives and eventive verbs, but strong interpretational parallels between *fun* adjectives and *morphologically related* eventive verbs.

[24] There's a particularly productive bunch: *-ing* participles (*frightening*, *boring*, *interesting*) of Object Experiencer Verbs (*frighten*, *bore*, *interest*). Schaffer (2011) (citing Peter Ludlow) and Glanzberg (ms) both take this to be an important fact about PPTs. I agree, although obviously not all *fun* adjectives (e.g. *fun*, *dreadful*) have this morphological structure.

4 *Fun* adjectives and evaluative character

4.1 Faultless disagreement

I want to turn now to some more foundational issues that have been central to the Literature on Predicates of Personal Taste.

Lasersohn begins his seminal paper with the distinction between facts and opinions. There's reason to hope that the semantics of PPTs might deliver insights into linguistic underpinnings or upshots of the phenomenon of opinion.

The thing about PPTs that has drawn the attention of semanticists is the fact that they can be used to express opinions apparently giving rise to **Faultless Disagreements**. Consider the discourses (83) and (84).

(83) Amanda: *The Texas Giant is fun.*
Ben: *Nuh-uh! The Texas Giant is not fun.*

(84) Amanda: *The Texas Giant is wooden.*
Ben: *Nuh-uh! The Texas Giant is not wooden.*

In (84) (assuming there's no crucial vagueness or indeterminacy in the interpretation of *wooden*) it is clear that exactly one of disputants will be correct. But not so in (83). In (83) it looks like each is simply expressing her own personal preference.[25] As long as they are both honest and sincere, it wouldn't appear that either is *wrong*; thus the faultlessness of the disagreement. Call a discourse like (83) a **Faultless Disagreement case**. (By this I simply mean the sort of case that has this *apparently* faultless character. I'm not going to consider the question of whether or not the disagreement is *in fact* faultless.)

This phenomenon has been the most important piece of evidence adduced in support of a new brand of **Relativist** semantic theories for PPTs.[26]

There are a number of different ways to characterize what's supposed to be problematic about discourses like (83). Here's a simple one.

The fact that Amanda and Ben apparently disagree in (83) makes **Negation** look very plausible, and the fact that they are both apparently *right* makes **Compatibility** look very plausible.

> **Negation**: Amanda asserts a proposition ϕ and Ben asserts its negation $\neg\phi$.
>
> **Compatibility**: What Amanda said is true and what Ben said is true.

[25] However, this characterization is called into question by examples like (11) and (12).
[26] E.g. Lasersohn (2005); Stephenson (2007); Egan (2010)

Assuming that negation is complementation, there will be no point of evaluation at which both ϕ and $\neg\phi$ are true. We still need some stuff connecting truth-at-a-point-of-evluation with truth *simpliciter*, but the fact that there's no point at which both what Amanda said is true and what Ben said is true looks like it will run afoul of **Compatibility**.

4.2 From Faultless Disagreement to evaluative character

One kind of argument Relativists make is that their opponents cannot explain the possibility of disagreements that are faultless. I'm going to consider a slightly different issue that also seems to underly the prima facie case against theories I'll call **Spare Contextualisms**: how can we explain why some *fun* sentences can give rise to Faultless Disagreement cases and others can't?

The fact that (83) is and (84) isn't a Faultless Disagreement case obviously has something to do with the difference between the adjectives *fun* and *wooden*. But it isn't as simple as that; though some *fun* sentences (like (10)) can give rise to Faultless Disagreement cases, others, like (15), can't.

(85) Amanda: *The Texas Giant is fun for me.*
Ben: ?? *Nuh-uh!*

What's the difference between what Amanda says in (83) (sentence (10)) and what she says in (85) (sentence (15)) in virtue of which (83) is a Faultless Disagreement case and (85) isn't?

The only surface difference between the two cases is the presence of the PPP *for me* in (15). And even though (10) lacks *for me*, it seems pretty clear that Amanda is expressing her perspective or point of view in both cases. So it's not obvious how to represent the difference between the two cases in terms of who's point of view is expressed.

However, the contrast between discourses (83) and (85) is stark. In (83), Ben is able to respond by giving *his* opinion, but in (85), he cannot. I think it is natural to say that this is because what Amanda says in (83) expresses her opinion (or her point of view) whereas in (85) she merely describes her disposition.

All I mean to do with this high-flown hand-waving about "fact" vs "opinion" and "describing a disposition" vs. "expressing a point of view" is motivate the idea that there is a fairly clear-cut distinction between *fun* sentences of an **evaluative** character - those that express a point of view, are subjective, are not settled by the objective facts, that can give rise to Faultless Disagreement cases - and those which are not of an evaluative character - which simply report the facts about certain responses or dispositions to respond. The **distributional problem of evaluativity** is simply: explain why the evaluative *fun* sentences are evaluative and why the non-evaluative *fun* sentences are not evaluative.[27]

[27] I primarily talk about evaluativity rather than Faultless Disagreement cases because the

4.3 Spare Contextualism's evaluativity problem

A **Spare Contextualist** accepts a lexical entry for PPTs along the lines of (88) and piously intones that the value of the second ("judge" or "standard") argument is fixed by the context of utterance.[28]

(88) $[\![fun]\!]^c = \lambda x \lambda y[fun'(y,x)]$

Here's the problem. Whatever the value that judge or standard argument takes for some evaluative *fun* sentence like (10), we can furnish an apparently non-evaluative *fun* sentence with the same judge argument and same overall denotation. That's because, with pretty minimal assumptions, it will turn out that sentence (10) is equivalent to a sentence of the form (89).

(89) *The Texas Giant is fun for* φ.

But at least prima facie, any sentence like this - e.g. those in (90) - will be non-evaluative and will merely report the disposition or preference of some individual or group.

(90) *The Texas Giant is fun for* {*me* / *you* / *Ben* / *most people* / *everyone*}.

In order to see this, suppose at context c the judge argument in the denotation of (10) gets the value a. So the overall denotation is

(91) $[\![(10)]\!]^c = fun'(tg,a)$

Now so long as you can furnish some phrase ϕ s.t. $[\![\phi]\!]^c = a$, I can construct an apparently non-evaluative sentence (89) that will get the exactly same denotation:

---

former is a property of *sentences* or *utterances* while the latter is only a property of multi-line, multi-speaker discourses.

Here are two further problems I have with "faultless disagreement":

(*i*) "Faultless Disagreement" is too narrow. There can be evaluativity without faultlessness, e.g. Humean molehill / Teneriffe cases:

(86) A: *Natty Ice is tastier than Westmalle Tripel.*
B: *Nuh-uh!*

This disagreement is evaluative but *not* faultless.

(*ii*) "Faultless Disagreement" is too broad. There are cases that seem to satisfy the term but are prima facie unrelated to the phenomenon of interest: e.g. Barker (2002)'s examples of "metalinguistic" disagreement in which speakers vie to set a gradable adjective cutoff point.

(87) A: *Feynman is tall.*
B: *Nuh-uh! 5'10" doesn't count as tall.*

[28] No, seriously: "I take no stance on how to evaluate covert experiencer arguments, save to piously intone that these are evaluated by context." Schaffer (2011) p. 191. Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) and Glanzberg (ms) are also Spare Contextualists.

(92) $[\![(10)]\!]^c = [\![(89)]\!]^c = fun'(tg,a)$

But if you take the evaluative / non-evaluative contrast seriously, you don't want an evaluative sentence like (10) to be equivalent to a non-evaluative sentence like (89). So Spare Contextualism is not well-positioned to address the distributional problem of evaluativity; evaluatives and non-evaluatives get precisely the same kind of semantic representation on that approach. While I don't think this point has been explicitly made against Contextualists before, I think it is implicit in a number of Relativist arguments that trade on the contrast between discourses like (83) and (85). But Relativism isn't the only way to make good on this contrast; the independently motivated genericity of some *fun* sentences gives us the tools we need for a much more conservative semantic theory that still captures the evaluative/non-evaluative contrast.

4.4 Whence evaluative character?

There is a clear distinction between the semantic representation of evaluative and non-evaluative fun sentences on my approach.

According to the proposal, evaluatives have some fancy modal meaning coming from the generic quantifier Γ.[29] No explanation yet for why (10) is and (15) isn't evaluative since they are both dispositional, and thus involve generic quantification. The truth-conditions of (10) are given in (93), and you might think the truth-conditions for (15) look something like (94).

(93) $[\![\Gamma[ride'(x,tg,e)\&respond.correctly'(x,tg,e)][fun'(tg,x,e)]]\!]^{w,B,g} = 1$ iff
For all w', (a_1, a_2) : if $w' \in B_w$ and
$[\![ride'(x,tg,e)\&respond.correctly'(x,tg,e)]\!]^{w',B,g[a_1/x,a_2/e]} = 1$
then $[\![fun'(tg,x,e)]\!]^{w',B,g[a_1/x,a_2/e]} = 1$
B_w is a realistic modal base

(94) $[\![\Gamma[ride'(a,tg,e)][fun'(tg,a,e)]]\!]^{w,B,g} = 1$ iff
For all e_1: if $[\![ride'(a,tg,e)]\!]^{w,B,g[e_1/e]} = 1$
then $[\![fun'(a,tg,e)]\!]^{w,B,g[e_1/e]} = 1$

What justifies positing the fancy modal stuff for (10) but not (15)? Actually, we need fancy modal stuff for (15) as well. Just not *evaluative* modal stuff. Because (94) means that all (though perhaps it should be *most* or *some* or ...) ridings of the Texas Giant are fun for me. But this isn't the correct truth-condition for (15). (15) means something like I'm *disposed* to enjoy the Texas Giant, which isn't captured merely by quantifying over my actual ridings. We need something more like (95).

[29] A similar idea has been suggested by Snyder (2013)

(95) $[\![\Gamma[ride'(a, tg, e)][fun'(tg, x, e)]]\!]^{w,B,g} = 1$ iff
For all w', e:
if $w' \in B_w$ and $[\![ride'(a, tg, e)]\!]^{w',B,g[a_1/x,a_2/e]} = 1$
then $[\![fun'(tg, a, e)]\!]^{w',B,g[a_1/x,a_2/e]} = 1$
B_w is set of worlds determined by a dispositional modal base applied to w[30]

Generic occurrences of *fun* adjectives do invariably have a modal interpretation, but not necessarily an evaluative modal interpretation. But what justifies suppoing that an evaluative interpretation of genericity in one case but a dispositional interpretation in the other?

Generics generally - even comparing quite similar examples - express a variety of different modal meanings.

We saw, for example, that (73) gets the normative modal interpretation (77). But variations on (73) can get non-normative modal interpretations.

(96) *Fuschia is spelled f-u-s-c-h-i-a by* {*Ben / people in the know / most of my students*}.

Here we get a dispositional or frequency interpretation. This behavior - the sometimes normative, other times non-normative interpretation of these *fuschia* habituals - parallels the sometimes evaluative, other times non-evaluative interpretation of dispositional *fun* adjectives. The distributional problem of evaluativity for dispositional *fun* sentences - at least the contrast between those like (10) and those like (15) - is part of the more general problem of the variable modal interpretation of Γ.

I have tried to provide evidence that a particular class of adjectives (*fun* ones) get their evaluativity via generic modality. But that doesn't mean *all* evaluativity gets encoded this way.

5 Beyond *fun* adjectives

A number of authors in the Literature on Predicates of Personal Taste have aimed for ambitious generality. Lasersohn (2005) is representative in considering only sentences with *fun* and *tasty*, but conjecturing that

[30]For more on dispositional modality, see Wasserman (2011). I should flag here the distinction between "derived" dispositional adjectives, like *fun*, and "primitive" dispositional adjectives like *fragile*, for which I think *linguistic* modality - e.g. a dispositional modal base in the semantics - is unnecessary. The impetus for dispositional modality with *fun* adjectives is precisely the fact that their primitive lexical meaning *isn't* dispositional. The dispositional meaning has to be compositionally derived via the habitual. *Fragile* (and ...) on the other hand *does* have a dispositional lexical meaning, and so needn't appeal to dispositional modality in the compositional semantics. However, also note that some other dispositional adjectives (e.g. *stupid*, *brilliant*, and *silly*) are *fun* ambiguous and thus presumably lexically non-dispositional with dispositional meanings derived compositionally in the *fun* way.

> *In principle, the analysis should apply in any case where, if one speaker asserts a sentence ϕ and another speaker asserts $\neg\phi$, we have an intuition of contradiction or direct disagreement, but where no objective facts can decide the issue, even in principle.*[31]

I hope to persuade you that such broad generalizations are unwarranted. I've suggested that any account of the unusual phenomena characteristic of *fun* and *tasty* should predict *when*[32] they do and don't get an evaluative interpretation. But robust generalizations about *fun* sentences break down when we try to extend them broadly to any case where we have "personal taste" or "where no objective facts can decide the issue, even in principle."

Here's a simple example of *fun* semantics overgeneralized. You might think everything we've said so far should apply to *stupid* adjectives (also sometimes called evaluative adjectives - *stupid*, *brilliant*, *silly*). Certainly they can be used to make judgments about which it appears that "objective facts [cannot] decide the issue, even in principle." But these adjectives interact in a quite different way with Prepositional Phrases. Relativists and Contextualists alike have tried to give a theory of PPTs that simultaneously explains Faultless Disagreement cases *and* more obviously distributional/compositional facts about PPTs, like the interaction with PPPs. I want to point out that just because an adjective gives rise to Faultless Disagreement cases, that doesn't guarantee that it interacts with PPs in exactly the way that *fun* does.

Dispositional *fun* adjectives are evaluative sans PPPs (10) and non-evaluative with PPPs (15), which seem to "shift" the point of view to a particular individual or group.

When a *stupid* adjective occurs with a PP, however, that PP doesn't specify a point of view from which the evaluation is made. Even with PPs, then, *stupid* sentences are evaluative. Contrast (97) and (98).

(97) *It was fun for Feynman to dance like that.*

(98) *It was stupid for Feynman to dance like that.*

While (97) reports that the dancing was fun from the point of view of Feynman, (98) expresses the point of view of the speaker, not Feynman. So if we're trying to give a semantic explanation of the distributional problem of evaluativity, we can't treat *fun* adjectives and *stupid* adjectives the same.

A second example: not all expressions which are prima facie evaluative exhibit the *fun* ambiguity. For instance, from the point of view of evaluativity (or non-objectivity, or Faultless Disagreement), sentences with *good* or *masterpiece* like (99) and (100) seem no different than those with *boring* like (8).

[31] Lasersohn (2005) p. 682

[32] i.e. in which sentential/discourse environments

(99) Andrei Rublev *is good.*

(100) Andrei Rublev *is a masterpiece.*

But adjectives like *good* or *bad* and nominals like *masterpiece* or *piece of shit* aren't *fun* ambiguous. They don't have an interpretation (with individual-denoting arguments, at least) that merely reports an experience of approbation or disapprobation. Which means no generic quantifier, and no habitual modality, and so obviously no evaluativity coming in via habitual modality. Presumably, then, in contrast to *fun* adjectives, *good* and *masterpiece* sentences get their evaluative character from the lexicon.

This would make for an interesting situation: some sentences (e.g. fun sentences) get their evaluative character via habitual modality, and others (*good* and *masterpiece* sentences) get it via the lexicon. We have two rather different linguistic vehicles for expressing evaluativity. This weighs heavily against the idea that there is a completely general semantic upshot of being the sort of expression that exhibits Faultless Disagreement.

One final example. Second only to Faultless Disagreement, embedability under $find$ has gained currency as a diagnostic of evaluative expressions.[33] Both fun and *stupid* do embed under $find$; so perhaps they have something importantly in common.

(101) *Ben finds the Texas Giant fun.*

(102) *Ben finds his new boss stupid.*

But many prima facie evaluative expressions are not so good under $find$.

(103) ? *Ben finds* Andrei Rublev *good.*

(104) **Ben finds* Andrei Rublev *a masterpiece.*

(105) **Ben finds his new boss a bastard.*[34]

There can certainly be Faultless Disagreements about the would-be subject matters of (103) - (105).

The metaphysical status "where no objective facts can decide the issue" does not determine any coherent linguistic category. The metaphysical category is

[33] The discussion in Sæbø (2009) is commonly cited on this.

[34] There might be some suspicion that the latter two cases indicate that $find$ simply doesn't like nominals in this construction. But that doesn't seem right; nominalizations of Object Experiencer Adjectives, for example, seem fine.

(106) *I find him an annoyance.*

(107) *I find him a bore.*

linguistically fragmented: there are importantly different linguistic categories (e.g. *fun* vs. *stupid* adjectives) that share a common claim to metaphysical non-objectivity. The evidence suggests that linguistic encoding of point of view or evaluativity is multifarious.

This is a serious problem for theories that take as given that there is some coherent semantic paradigm deserving the label "predicates of personal taste." I think there is, in contrast, a case to be made that *fun* adjectives are a coherent paradigm: adjectives that (a) license non-finite complements[35](in contrast to most adjectives) and (b) can have their point of view specified by PPs (in contrast to *stupid* adjectives).

There are, however, coherent linguistic categories - even individual expressions! - that are *metaphysically fragmented* w.r.t. objectivity. There are *better* judgments "where no objective facts can decide the issue" - perhaps e.g. (108).

(108) Andrei Rublev *is a better film than* Finding Nemo.

But there are also *better* where objective facts absolutely decide the issue.

(109) *Lebron James is a better basketball player than I am.*

(110) *72 is a better golf score than 73.*

Yet I know of no difference in the distributional or compositional behavior of *better* occurrences like the one in (108) vs. those in (109) and (110). So it is not clear that non-objectivity or Faultless Disagreement has any relevance whatsoever to the semantics of *better*.

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